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2 COMMISSION INTERPRETATIVE COMMUNICATION 
FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND THE INTEREST OF THE 
GENERAL GOOD IN THE SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE 
This Communitcation is the product of  the discussions conducted by the Commission on the 
questions of the  freedom  to  provide  services  and  the  interest  of the  general  good  in the 
Second Banking Directive1• 
Not  only  the  Member States  (within  the  Banking  Advisory  Committee  and  the 
Working Group  on  the  Interpretation  of  the  Banking  Directives)  but  also  private 
establishments have been involved in the discussions. 
The Commission published, in the Official Journal of the European Communities2,  a draft 
communication which marked the launch of a broad consultation. Following the publication 
of this  Communication,  the  Commission  received  numerous  contributions  from  all  the 
circles  concerned  (Member States,  professional  associations,  credit institutions,  consumer 
organizations,  lawyers, etc.). It also  organized hearings with all the parties who  had taken 
part in the written consultation. 
The Commission came to realize in the course of this consultation that there was still some 
uncertainty regarding the interpretation of  basic concepts such as freedom to provide services 
and  the  interest of the  general  good.  This  uncertainty  is  such  as  to  deter  certain  credit 
institutions  from  exercising  the  very  freedoms  which  the  Second  Directive  sets  out  to 
promote and,  consequently,  to  hamper the  free  movement of banking services within the 
European Union. 
The Commission therefore deems it desirable to  restate in a Communication the principles 
laid down by the  Court of Justice and  to  set out its  position regarding the  application of 
those principles to the specific problems raised by the Second Banking Directive. 
Its  objective in publishing this  Communication is  to  explain  and  clarify the  Community 
rules. It  provides all the parties concerned - national administrations, traders and consumers -
with a reference document defining the legal framework within which,  in the view of the 
Commission, banking activities benefiting from mutual recognition should be pursued. 
2 
Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the  business of credit institutions and 
amending Directive 77/780/EEC (OJ No L 386, 30.12.1989, p.  1),  as  amended by Directive 92/30/EEC 
(OJ No L 110, 28.4.1992, p. 52). 
OJNoC291,4.11.1995,p. 7. 
3 The interpretations and ideas set out in this Communication, which are confined to problems 
specifically related to the Second Directive, set out to  cover not all possible situations, but 
merely the most frequent or the most likely. 
They are put forward in the  light of Community policy regarding the  information society, 
which  is  aimed  at  promoting  the  growth  and  movement  of information-society  services 
between Member States and, in particular, electronic commerce3. 
They  do  not  necessarily  represent  the  views  of the  Member States  and  should  not,  m 
themselves, impose any obligation on them. 
Lastly, they do not prejudge the interpretation that the Court of Justice, as the final instance 
responsible for interpreting the Treaty and secondary legislation, might place on the matters 
at issue. 
3  Council Resolution on new policy priorities regarding the information society, adopted on 8 October 1996; 
Commission Communication to  the  European Council:  "Putting services to  work":  CSE(96) 6  fmal  of 
27 November 1996; Communication to  the European Parliament, the Council of the  European Union and 
the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  entitled  "Regulatory  transparency  in  the  single  market  for 
information society services"; Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive amending for the 
third time Directive 83/189/EEC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of 
technical standards and regulations (COM(96) 392  final  of 30 August 1996;  also  published in  OJ No C 
307, 16.10.1996, p.  11). 
4 PART ONE: FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES IN THE 
SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE 
Part One analyses in tum (A) the results of the consultations on the notification procedure, 
(B) the difficulties relating to the distinction between the freedom to provide services and the 
right of establishment and (C) the question of the time when an activity falling within the 
scope of  the freedom to provide services may begin. 
A.  NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
1.  Scope in terms of  time 
Article 20(1) of  the Second Banking Directive provides that: 
"Any credit institution wishing to exercise the freedom to provide services by carrying on 
its activities within the territory of  another Member State for the first time shall notify the 
competent authorities of  the home Member State of  the activities on the list in the Annex 
which it intends to carry on. "  · 
The procedure laid down in Article 20(1) thus concerns only those credit institutions (and 
their subsidiaries within the meaning of Article 18(2)) which intend to conduct for the first 
time  an  activity  listed  in  the  Annex.  Article 23(2)  provides  for  an  exemption  from 
notification  for  credit  institutions  which  provided  services  before  the  provisions 
implementing the Directive came into force. 
The Commission considers that, in order to benefit from acquired rights, a credit institution 
need  only  have  provided  a  service  at  least  once  in  the  territory  of a  Member State  (in 
accordance with the line of reasoning set out in  section 2 below), regardless of when that 
was,  but  it  must  have  carried  on  this  activity  lawfully  within  the  territory  of the 
Member State in question. It must also be able to furnish evidence of  this previous activity if 
so requested by the competent authority of  the country of  origin. 
The exemption is, however, restricted to the activity and Member State concerned. 
The Commission considers that the lawful nature of  the previous activity should be assessed 
at  the time when this  activity was being exercised and  not at  the  time when the  Second 
Directive  entered  into  force.  It is  irrelevant,  therefore,  whether  the  host  Member State's 
legislation changed after the activity was exercised by the credit institution. It is, of course, 
assumed that the institution complied with the host country's new legislation if it continued 
to  carry on its activities there or that it  ceased its  activities under the  freedom  to  provide 
services at that time. 
2.  Scope in terms of  territory 
(a)  Principles 
5 Article 20( 1)  of the  Second Directive makes implementation of the notification procedure 
conditional  upon  the  intention  to  carry  on  activities  "within  the  territory  of another 
Member State". 
It is  necessary, therefore,  to  "locate" the place of supply of the  future  banking service  in 
order to determine whether prior notification is required. 
Unlike other services, where the place of supply can give rise to  no  doubts (legal defence, 
construction  of a  building,  etc.),  the  banking  services  listed  in  the  Annex  to  the 
Second Directive are difficult to pin down to a specific location. The are also very different 
from  one  another  and  are  increasingly  provided  in  an  intangible  form.  The  growth  of 
distance services, particularly those using electronic means  (Internet,  home banking, etc.), 
will undoubtedly soon result in excessively strict criteria on location becoming obsolete. 
The Commission has examined certain possibilities for locating the service (originator of  the 
initiative,  customer's  place  of residence,  supplier's  place  of establishment,  place  where 
contracts  are  signed,  etc.)  and  considers  that  none  could  satisfactorily  apply  to  all  the 
activities listed in the Annex. 
It considers it necessary to adhere to a simple and flexible interpretation of Article 20 of the 
Second Directive. Accordingly, in its opinion, only activities carried on within the territory 
of another Member State should be the subject of prior notification.  In order to  determine 
where  an  activity  was  carried  on,  the  place  of provision  of what  may  be  termed  the 
"characteristic performance" of  the service, i.e. the essential supply for which payment is due 
must be determined. 
This line of  reasoning is aimed merely at establishing whether prior notification is necessary. 
It does not affect the law or tax system applicable to the banking service concerned. 
(b)  Application to the Second Directive 
A  bank  may  have  non-resident  customers  without  necessarily  pursuing  the  actlvttles 
concerned  within  the  territory  of  the  Member States  where  the  customers  have 
their domicile. 
Consequently, the fact of temporarily visiting the territory of a Member State to carry on an 
activity preceding (e.g. survey of property prior to granting a loan) or following (incidental 
activities) the essential activity does not,  in the Commission's view, constitute a situation 
that is liable in itself to be the subject of prior notification. The same is  true of any visits 
which a credit institution may pay to customers if such visits do not involve the provision of 
the  characteristic  performance  of the  service  that  is  the  subject  of  the  contractual 
relationship. 
Furthermore, the Commission considers that the fact of  temporarily visiting the territory of a 
Member State  in  order  to  conclude  contracts  prior to  the  exercise  of a  banking  activity 
should not be regarded  as  exercising  the  activity  itself.  Prior  notification  would  not  be 
required in such circumstances. 
6 If,  on the other hand, the institution intends to  provide the characteristic performance of a 
banking service by sending a member of its staff or a temporarily authorized intermediary to 
the territory of  another Member State, prior notification should be necessary. 
Conversely,  if the  service  is  supplied  to  a  beneficiary  who  has  gone  in  person,  for  the 
purpose of receiving that service, to the Member State where the institution is  established, 
prior notification should not take place. The Commission considers, in fact, that the service 
is not provided by the credit institution in the territory of another Member State within the 
meaning of  Article 20 of  the Second Banking Directive. 
Lastly, the provision of distance banking services, for example through the Internet, should 
not,  in  the  Commission's  view,  require  prior  notification,  since  the  supplier  cannot  be 
deemed to be pursuing its activities in the customer's territory. 
The Commission is aware that this solution will require a case-by-case analysis, which could 
prove difficult. 
It is also aware that, as long as the Court has not ruled on this issue, any credit institution is 
at liberty to choose, for reasons of legal certainty, to make use of  the notification procedures 
provided  for  in  the  Second  Directive  even  if,  according  to  the  criteria  proposed  above, 
notification may not be necessary. 
The fact that certain types of supplies of services do not, according to  the Commission, fall 
within the  scope of Article 20  of the  Second Directive  and,  consequently,  should not  be 
notified does not mean that  such  activities  are  not  the  subject of mutual recognition  and 
home-country control. 
The Commission considers that mutual recognition of the activities contained in the Annex, 
accompanied by home-country control, is established by Article 18 of the Second Directive. 
Article 20 is merely a procedural article, of residual scope, which is  merely for  the use of 
banks wishing to operate for the first time under the freedom to provide services in another 
Member State. 
3.  Advertising and offers of  services 
The Commission considers  that  the  prior  existence  of advertising  or an  offer  cannot  be 
linked with the need to comply with the notification procedure. 
Such  a  link  would  be  artificial  in  that  no  express  provision  for  it  is  made  in  the 
Second Directive.  It is  not  the  prior offer of a service  to  a  non-resident  but merely  the 
intention to  carry on activities within the territory of another Member State that Article 20 
makes conditional on notification. 
Moreover,  canvassing  customers  from  a  distance  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  an 
institution plans to provide services within the territory of  another Member State. 
7 Similarly, linking advertising with notification could lead to ridiculous situations in which an 
institution was required to  notify the  authorities of all  the countries where  its  advertising 
might theoretically be received. 
The Commission therefore considers that, for the sake of simplicity and in keeping with the 
Second Directive, all forms of advertising, targeted or otherwise, and all offers of a service 
made  at  a  distance  by  any  means  whatsoever  (e.g.  post,  fax,  electronic  mail)  should  be 
exempt from the requirement of prior notification. Only if a credit institution plans to carry 
on its activities within the territory of  the customer's country under the freedom to provide 
services (according to the line of reasoning employed in paragraph (a)) will it be obliged to 
notify. 
This  view,  which  concerns  only  the  notification  requirement,  does  not  affect  the  law 
applicable to  the banking service.  In accordance with the Rome Convention\ the existence 
of a specific  invitation or prior advertising  may,  in  the  case of contracts concluded with 
consumers, have an effect on the law applicable to the contract concluded subsequentlys. 
4.  Nature of  the procedure 
The Commission considers that the notification procedure laid down in the Second Directive 
pursues a simple objective of  exchange of  information between supervisory authorities and is 
not a consumer-protection measure. It should not, in the Commission's view, be considered a 
procedural condition affecting the validity of  a banking contract. 
5.  Future of  the procedure 
As a result of  the debate launched by the draft communication, the Commission realized that 
many interested parties were in favour of  simply abolishing the notification procedure within 
the  context of the  freedom  to  provide  services.  On  the  other  hand,  some  contributions 
stressed  how  useful  the  procedure  was  in  checking  compliance  with  the  interest  of the 
general good and, in particular, with consumer-protection rules. 
Some of those who called for the system to  be abolished considered that it was not in line 
with the Treaty, being a disproportionate restriction on freedom to provide services. Others 
drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  third-country  banks  were  not  covered  by  it.  Others  still 
considered that it was costly and unnecessary and could give rise to legal risks. 
In  the  Commission's  view,  while  the  notification  procedure  should  be  clarified  and 
simplified,  it  should  be  no  more  than  a  simple  administrative  formality  permitting  the 
notifier to benefit from considerable advantages. 
4 
5 
Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  contractual  obligations,  opened  for  signature  in  Rome 
on 19 June 1980 and brought into force  on 1 April  1991  (OJ No L 266,  9.10.1980, p.  1).  Ratified by all 
Member States except Sweden, Austria and Finland, who  signed the  Convention on 29 November 1996 
and whose ratification procedures are still under way. 
See Part Two of this Communication. 
8 It considers that the interpretations proposed above would clarify the scope of a procedure 
which,  on  account  of the  very  groWth  of the  cross~border supply  of banking  services, 
particularly in the context of electronic commerce, is bound to become almost obsolete. The 
more services are provided without any physical movement, the less the notification will be 
used. 
The Commission could,  in due course,  envisage proposing the  abolition of the procedure 
altogether in the context of  the freedom to provide services. 
B.  FREEDOM TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT 
I.  Freedom to provide services 
(a)  Temporary nature 
The Treaty stipulates in the third paragraph of Article 60 that a person providing a service 
may,  in order to  do  so,  "temporarily" pursue his activity in the State where the service is 
provided. The Court considered, in a judgment of 30 November 19956,  that the temporary 
nature of  the supply of  services provided for by this Article: 
"is to be determined in the light of  its duration, regularity, periodicity and continuity." 
On  the  basis  of this  case-law,  the  Commission  considers  that,  if a  banking  activity  is 
exercised within a territory in a durable, frequent, regular or continuous manner by a credit 
institution exercising the freedom  to provide services, the  question must be  asked whether 
that credit institution can still lawfully be considered to  be working temporarily within the 
meaning  of the  Treaty.  The  question  also  arises  whether  the  credit  institution  is  not 
attempting to  sidestep the rules on establishment by unjustifiably invoking the  freedom  to 
provide services. 
(b)  Preventing circumvention of  the rules 
The  Court  has  acknowledged  that  a Member State  is  entitled  to  take  steps  to  prevent  a 
service provider whose activity is  entirely or mainly directed towards its territory, but who 
has  become  established  in  another  Member State  in  order  to  circumvent  the  rules  of 
professional conduct that would apply to  him if he were established in the territory of the 
State  where  he  entirely or mainly  pursues  his  activities,  from  exercising  the  freedom  to 
provide services that is enshrined in Article 59 of the Treaty7• It adds that such instances of 
"circumvention" may  fall  within  the  ambit  of the  chapter of the  Treaty  on the  right  of 
establishment and not of  that on the provision of  services. 
6 
7 
Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165. 
Case 205/84  Commission  v Germany [1986]  ECR 3755; Case 33/74  Van  Binsbergen  [1974]  ECR 1299; 
Case C-148/91  Veronica [1993] ECR I-487; Case C-23/93 TV 10 [1994] ECR I-4795. 
9 However, the Commission considers that a situation where a credit institution is  frequently 
approached within its own territory by consumers residing in other Member States could not 
be held to constitute "circumvention". 
2.  Right of  establishment 
If an undertaking maintains a permanent presence in the Member State in which it provides 
services, it comes, in principle, under the Treaty provisions on the right of  establishments. 
The Court has ruled that: 
"A  national of a  Member State  who  pursues  a professional activity  on  a  stable  and 
continuous basis in another Member State where he holds himself  out  from an established 
professional base to, amongst others, nationals of  that State comes under the provisions of 
the chapter relating to the right of  establishment and not those of  the chapter relating to 
services9. " 
However, in the same judgment, the Court ruled that a person operating under the freedom to 
provide  services  may  equip  himself in  the  host  Member State  with  the  infrastructure 
necessary for the purposes of performing the services in question without falling within the 
scope of  the right of  establishment. 
On the basis of this case-law, an employee of a credit institution coming to work within the 
territory  of a  Member State  in  order to  carry  out  a  limited  number of specific  tasks  in 
connection with existing  customers  could,  therefore,  have  the  infrastructure necessary to 
perform these tasks without the bank being deemed to be "established" within the meaning 
laid down by Community law.  If,  on the other hand, he went beyond the bounds of these 
specific tasks by using that ''pied-a-terre" to approach nationals of the host Member State, 
e.g. to offer them banking services as a branch would do, the bank could fall within the scope 
of  the right of  establishment. 
3.  "Grey" area 
It is  not always easy to  draw the  line  between the concepts of provision of services  and 
establishment,  particularly  since,  as  the  case-law  of the  Court  indicates,  one  may  be 
considered in certain circumstances to be operating in a Member State under the freedom to 
provide services despite having some kind of  infrastructure in that Member State. 
Some situations are particularly difficult to classify. This is especially true of: 
•  recourse to independent intermediaries; and 
•  electronic machines (ATMs) carrying out banking activities. 
(a) 
8 
9 
Independent intermediaries 
Case 205/84 Commission v Germany; see note 7. 
Case C-55/94 Gebhard; see note 6. 
10 The problem lies in determining the extent to which ~ credi,t institution having recourse to an 
independent  intermediary  in  another  Member State  couid  be  deemed  to  be  pursuing  a 
permanent activity in that Member State. 
We are concerned here with intermediaries who drum up business but are not in themselves 
credit institutions or investment firms, and who are not operating on their own behalf. 
In its judgment of  4 December 198610, the Court held that: 
"an  insurance  undertaking of another  Member State  which  maintains  a  permanent 
presence in the Member State in question comes within the scope of  the provisions of  the 
Treaty on the right of  establishment, even if  that presence does not take the form of  a 
branch or agency, but consists merely of  an office managed by the undertaking's own staff 
or by a person who is independent but authorized to  act on a permanent basis for the 
undertaking, as will be the case with an agency. " 
The  Court  has  therefore  acknowledged  that  an  undertaking  which  uses  an  intermediary 
within the territory of another Member State on a permanent basis may, on account of that 
fact,  lose its status as  a service provider and fall within the scope of the provisions on the 
right of  establishment. 
The Commission, therefore, suggests the following interpretations. 
•  Intermediaries and freedom to provide services 
In the view of the Commission, if a bank uses  an  intermediary to  provide temporarily or 
from time to time a banking service within the territory of  a Member State, it must first give 
notification within the meaning of  Article 20 of  the Second Directive. 
It considers that if, in a given country, a bank has independent intermediaries whose duties 
consist solely in seeking customers for it, it cannot be considered to be necessarily intending 
to  carry  on  its  activities,  within  the  meaning  of Article 20,  in  the  territory  of the 
Member State in question. Notification would not be required in that case. 
On the other hand, in certain circumstances set out below, it may be considered that a bank 
having one or more intermediaries permanently established in a Member State does in fact 
come within the rules on the right of  establishment. 
•  Intermediaries and the right of establishment 
In its De Bloos ruling of6 October 1976 11, the Court held that: 
:~ 
"One of  the essential characteristics of  the concepts of  branch or agency is the fact of 
being subject to the direction and control of  the parent body." 
IO  See note 7. 
II  Case 14/76 [1976] ECR 1497. 
11 It concluded that a sole concessionaire not subject to the control and direction of a company 
could not be regarded as a branch, agency or establishment. 
In its ruling of 18 March 1981  in Blanckaert &  Willems 12, the Court held that: 
"An independent commercial agent who  merely negotiates  business,  inasmuch  as  his 
legal status leaves him basically free to arrange his own work and decide what proportion 
of  his time to devote to the interests of  the undertaking which he agrees to represent and 
whom that undertaking may not prevent from representing at the same time several firms 
competing in the same manufacturing or marketing sector,  and who,  moreover,  merely 
transmits orders to the parent undertaking without being involved in either their terms or 
their execution, does  not have the character of  a branch, agency or other establishment 
"  ...  . 
In  even  more  pointed  terms,  m  its  Somafer  ruling  of 22 November 197813,  the  Court 
held that: 
"The concept of  branch, agency or other establishment implies a place of  business which 
has  the appearance  of permanency,  such  as  the  extension  of a parent body,  has  a 
management and is materially equipped to  negotiate business with  third parties, so  that 
the latter,  although knowing that there will if  necessary be a legal link with the parent 
body,  the head office of which is abroad,  do  not have to  deal directly with  such parent 
body but may transact business at the place of  business constituting the extension. " 
On  the  basis  of these  precedents,  the  Commission  considers  that,  for  the  use  of an 
intermediary  to  result  in  a  bank  possibly  falling  within  the  scope  of  the  right  of 
establishment, three criteria must be met at one and the same time: 
the intermediary must have a permanent mandate; 
the  intermediary  must  be  subject  to  the  management and control of the  credit 
institution he  represents.  In  order to  ascertain  whether this  condition is  met,  it  is 
necessary to check whether the intermediary is free to organize his own work and to 
decide what proportion of his time to  devote to  the undertaking.  A final  pointer is 
whether  the  intermediary  can  represent  several  firms  competing  to  provide  the 
service concerned or whether he is, on the contrary, bound by an exclusive agreement 
to one credit institution; 
12  Case 139/80 [1981) ECR 819. 
13  Case 33/78 [1978] ECR 2183. See also Case  C-43~.93 Lloyd's Register of  Shipping v Societe Campenon 
Bernard, [1995] ECR 1-961. 
12 the intermediary must be able to  commit the credit institution.  A credit institution 
may  be  committed  via  an  intermediary  even  if that  intermediary  cannot  sign 
contracts. For example, if  the intermediary can make a complete offer on behalf of  an 
institution but only the bank itself has the power to sign the contract, the criterion of · 
commitment  may  still  be  met.  If the  credit  institution  can  reject  the  proposal 
submitted  by the  intermediary  and  signed  by  the  customer,  the  criterion  of the 
commitment capacity is not met. 
The application of these three criteria requires a detailed examination to  be carried out in 
each specific case. 
The  fact  that  an  intermediary can cause  a  bank  to  fall  within  the  scope of the  right  of 
establishment does not, however, mean that the intermediary himself constitutes a branch. 
Under  the  Second  Directive,  a  branch  is  "a  place  of business  which  forms  a  legally 
dependent  part  of a  credit  institution  (..) ".  Since  the  intermediary  is  assumed  to  be 
independent, he cannot constitute  "part" of a credit institution. His bu.siness will normally 
be established in the form of  a company having its own legal personality. 
Finally, if  a bank's services are marketed in another Member State through the intermediary 
of another bank, notification should not, logically speaking, be necessary. The fact that the 
intermediate bank is itself subject to supervision in the Member State where it is established 
should  offer  that  Member State  sufficient  guarantees  for  it  to  consider  notification 
unnecessary. If  the intermediate bank is acting on its own behalf, notification should not take 
place,  since  such  a  situation  does  not  fall  within  the  scope  of the  freedom  to  provide 
cross-border services. 
(b)  Electronic machines 
This  means  fixed,  ATM-type  electronic  machines  capable  of performing  the  banking 
activities listed in the Annex to the Second Directive14• 
Such machines may be covered by the right of establishment if they fulfil  the criteria laid 
down by the Court of  Justice (see above). 
For such a machine to be capable of being treated as  an establishment, therefore, it would 
have  to  have  a  management,  which  is  by  definition  impossible  unless  the  Court 
acknowledges  that  the  concept  can  encompass  not  only  human  management  but  also 
electronic management. 
However, such a machine is unlikely to be the only place of  business of  a credit institution in 
a Member State. It is likely to be attached, in the same country, to a branch or an agency. In 
that event, the machine is not an entity in its own right as it is covered by the rules governing 
the establishment to which it is attached. 
14  It does  not mean individual,  mobile  data-processing  equipment  which  can provide  or receive  distance 
banking services, e.g. through the Internet. 
13 If the  machine  does,  however,  constitute  the  only  presence  of a  credit  institution  in  a 
Member State,  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  it  may  be  possible  to  treat  it  as  a 
provision of  services in the territory of  that Member State. 
The presence in the host country of a person or company responsible simply for maintaining 
the machine,  equipping it  and  dealing with  any  technical  problems  encountered by users 
cannot rank as  an establishment and does  not deprive the credit institution of the right to 
operate under the freedom to provide services. 
The Commission considers, however, that technological developments could, in the future, 
induce it to review its position. 
If such developments were to make it possible for an institution to have only a machine in a 
given  country  which  could  "act"  as  a  branch,  taking  actual  decisions  which  would 
completely obviate the need for the customer to  have contact with the parent company, the 
Commission would be forced to  consider an  appropriate Community legal framework.  The 
present legal  framework  in  fact  rests on mechanisms which  are  still based on  a "human" 
concept of a branch (for example, the programme of operations must contain the names of 
those responsible for the management of the branch). It is  therefore not possible, under the 
existing rules, to consider machines as constituting a branch. 
4.  Simultaneous  exercise  of  the  freedom  to  provide  services  and  the  right 
of  establishment 
The Commission considers that there  is  nothing  in  the  Treaty,  Directives  or case-law  to 
prevent  a  credit  institution  from  carrying  on  its  activities  under  the  freedom  to  provide 
services and, at the same time, through some form of establishment (branch or subsidiary), 
even ifthe same activities are involved. 
The institution must, however, be able clearly to connect the activity to one of  the two forms 
of  operation. This connection is important from both a tax and a regulatory point ofviewls. It 
should be ensured that an institution is not able "artificially" to connect its activities to  the 
arrangements governing freedom to provide services as  a way of sidestepping the legal and 
tax framework which would apply ifthe same activity were considered to be carried on by a 
branch or by any other form of  establishment16. 
5.  Control by the host Member State of  the conditions for granting a passport 
The Commission interprets a recent ruling by the Court of Justice17  to  mean that the host 
country may not carry  out checks  to  determine  whether  a  credit  institution  intending  to 
15  Consideration  may,  for  example,  be  given  to  the  importance  of the  connection  for  the  purposes  of 
determining the deposit-guarantee scheme. 
16  See footnote 7. 
17  See  the  judgment delivered  by  the  Court  on  10 September 1996  on  a  similar  issue  in  Case C-11195 
Commission  v  Belgium [1996]  ECR 1-4115.  The Court ruled that the receiving Member State  was  not 
authorized to monitor the  application of the  law of the  originating Member State applying to  television 
14 operate in its territory under the freedom  to  provide services or through a branch met the 
standard conditions for granting the single licence in its home country. Such checks may be 
carried out by the home Member State alone. It is on the responsibility of  the home country 
that the single licence is granted, and the host country car:i:not question the granting of  such a 
licence. 
If the host country has reason to  doubt that the standard conditions have been met,  it  may 
have recourse to Article 170 of the Treaty or request the Commission to  take action against 
the home Member State  for  failing  to  meet  its  obligations pursuant to  Article 169  of the 
Treaty. 
6.  Miscellaneous 
In the Commission's opinion, it would very likely be contrary to Community law for a credit 
institution which has carried on its business under the freedom to provide services within the 
territory of a Member State for  a given length of time to be forced by that Member State to 
become established as a prerequisite for the continued pursuit of  its activities. 
It also considers that the freedom to provide services may be exercised by a branch vis-a-vis 
a third Member State. In such a situation, it is necessary for the branch's home Member State 
to  have  sent notification (Article 20)  to  that  third Member State  (provided, of course,  the 
conditions for notification are met). 
C.  COMMENCEMENT OF THE PROVISION OF SERVICES 
The  problem  lies  in  the  interpretation of Article 20(2)  of the  Second  Banking Directive, 
which merely lays down that: 
"The competent authorities of  the home Member State shall, within one month of  receipt 
of the notification  mentioned in paragraph 1,  send that notification  to  the competent 
authorities of  the host Member State." 
Consequently,  the  procedure  to  be  followed  prior  to  exercising  the  freedom  to  provide 
services differs from  that applicable to  the establishment of a branch, in that,  for the latter 
arrangement,  Article 19(5)  provides for  the  "receipt" by the branch of a  "communication" 
from the competent authorities of the host Member State or, failing that, the absence of any 
such  communication  for  a  period  of two  months  as  a  prerequisite  for  the  branch  to 
commence its activities. 
This triangular relationship  is  not provided  for  in  the  context of the  freedom  to  provide 
services, for which there is a more flexible set of arrangements deliberately provided for by 
the  Community  legislature  so  as  not  to  create  obstacles  which  did  not  exist  under  the 
previous arrangements. 
broadcasts  and to  ensure  compliance  with  Council  Directive  89/552/EEC  (known  as  the  "TV without 
frontiers" Directive; OJ No L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23). 
15 A credit institution should therefore be able to commence its activities under the freedom to 
provide  services  as  soon  as  it  has  notified  its  intention  to  its  own  supervisory 
authorities, which, under Article 20(2), have one month in which to send that notification to 
the supervisory authorities of  the host country. 
In the Commission's opinion,  where the host  Member State requires,  as  a prerequisite  to 
commencement  of any  activity  relating  to  the  provision  of  services  in  its  territory 
(a procedure  envisaged  for  the  establishment  of a  branch),  that  an  acknowledgement  of 
receipt  of the  notification  sent  by  the  country  of origin  be  issued,  this  constitutes  an 
infringement of  the Second Directive. 
16 PART TWO: THE GENERAL GOOD IN THE 
SECOND BANKING DIRECTIVE 
Part Two examines in tum the question of  (A) notification of  rules adopted in the interest of 
the general good, (B) problems connected with the application of  rules adopted in the interest 
ofthe general good and (C) private international law. 
A.  NOTIFICATION  OF  RULES  ADOPTED  IN  THE  INTEREST  OF  THE 
GENERAL GOOD 
In the view ofthe Commission, it is difficult to infer from the wording of  Article 19(4) of  the 
Second Directive that there is any obligation on the host country to inform a credit institution 
wishing to set up a branch in its territory of  the conditions to be fulfilled in the interest ofthe 
general  good.  The  term  "if necessary"  indicates  that  Member States  may  exercise  their 
discretion in this connection. 
Nevertheless,  the  Commission  considers  that,  in  keeping  with  the  spirit'  of  the 
Second Directive, a credit institution which has let it be known, via its supervisory authority, 
that it wishes to  set up  a branch and would like to  find  out about the general-good rules 
applicable in the host country should be able to obtain the information it is seeking from that 
Member State. 
Where the Member State responds favourably to the credit institution's request, it should, in 
the Commission's opinion, be bound only by an obligation as to means and not as to result. 
That is to  say that it cannot be required to  communicate all  its  legislation relating to  the 
interest of the general good (only legislation applicable to  banking activities)  and,  in any 
event, a text which was not communicated could still be fully relied on against the credit 
institution. It is inconceivable that the application of a legal provision within the territory of 
the  Member State  which  adopted  it  should  be  ruled  out  on  the  ground  that  a  prior 
administrative formality has not been carried out. 
The Commission agrees that the optional nature of  notification by the host Member State of 
its general-good rules may constitute an obstacle to the exercise of  the right of  establishment. 
How can a credit institution know what rules it has to observe if a Member State refuses to 
notify it of those rules? This situation was, moreover, almost unanimously deplored during 
the consultations which the Commission recently conducted with the banking sector. 
The Commission will make every attempt to remedy this situation. 
B.  APPLICATION  OF  RULES  ADOPTED  IN  THE  INTEREST  OF  THE 
GENERAL GOOD 
The main purpose of  the Second Banking Directive is to enable authorized credit institutions 
in a Member State to  supply, throughout the European Union,  all or some of the  banking 
activities listed in the Annex, either by the establishment of  a branch or under the freedom to 
17 provide  services,  on  condition  that  such  activities  are  covered  by  the  authorization 
(Article 18). 
Community law has not, however, harmonized the content of banking activities, with a few 
exceptions such as some aspects of  consumer credit18. 
It is  likely, therefore,  that a credit institution wishing to  carry on its  activities  in  another 
Member State will be confronted with different rules applicable both to the service itself and 
to the conditions in which it may be offered and marketed. It suffices, for example, to think 
of  the variety ofnational rules applicable to loans. 
The sixteenth recital of  the Second Directive reads: 
"  .. the Member States must ensure that there are no obstacles to  carrying on  activities 
receiving mutual recognition in the same manner as  in  the home Member State, as long 
as the latter do  not conflict with legal provisions protecting the general good in the host 
Member State". 
It  should  be  pointed  out  that,  since  the  recitals  to  a  directive  have  legal  value  as 
an aid to interpretation,  they  shed  light  for  the  reader  on  the  intentions  of  the 
Community legislature19. 
The  Commission  considers  that  a  credit  institution  operating  in  the  context  of mutual 
recognition could, therefore, be forced to bring its services into line with the legislation of 
the host country only if the measures relied on against it are in the interest of the general 
good, whether it is acting via a branch or under the freedom to provide services. 
This approach is, moreover, confirmed by the Court of Justice, which has ruled that only the 
general-good rules  can  restrict  or hinder  the  exercise  of the  two  fundamental  freedoms, 
namely the freedom to provide services20 and the freedom of  establishment21. 
Consequently,  a credit institution would be entitled to  challenge, by means of a  legal  or 
administrative procedure or a complaint to the Commission, the legitimacy, with regard to 
Community law, of  a national legal norm that is imposed upon it. 
However,  the  Second  Banking  Directive  does  not  contain  any  definition  of 
"the general good". The reason for this is that, in non-harmonized areas, the level of general 
good involved depends on the assessment of the Member States and can vary substantially 
from  one  country  to  another  according  to  national  traditions  and  the  objectives  of the 
Member States. 
18  Directive 87/102/EEC of 22.12.1986, OJ No L 42,  12.2.1987, p.  48; Directive 90/88/EEC of 22.2.1990, 
OJ No L 61, 10.3.1990, p.  14. 
19  See in particular Case 76/72 Michel [1973] ECR 457. 
2° Case C-76/90 Sliger v Dennemeyer [1991]  ECR 1-4221.  See  the  analysis contained in the  Commission 
interpretative communication concerning the  free  movement of services across frontiers,  OJ No C 334, 
9.12.1993, p. 3. 
21  Case C-55/94 Gebhard,; see note 6.  See also judgment in Case C-19/92 Kraus [1993] 1-1663. 
18 Similarly,  the  Second  Directive  does  not  specify  within  what  limits  and  under  what 
conditions the host Member State may  impose its  general-good rules  upon a  Community 
credit institution. 
It is necessary, therefore, to refer to the relevant case-law of  the Court of  Justice. 
1.  Definition of  the general good 
It is the Court of  Justice which orginated this concept. It has consistently held that: 
"Taking into account the particular nature of  certain services to be provided(.  .. ), specific 
requirements imposed on persons providing services cannot be considered incompatible 
with the Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of  professional rules, 
justified by the general good (. ..  ).22" 
However, the Court has never given a definition of the general good, preferring to maintain 
its progressive nature. It has expressed its opinion, in individual cases, on the possibility of 
deeming a given national measure to be aimed at achieving an imperative objective serving 
the  general  good  and  has  specified  the  line  of reasoning  to  be  followed  in  determining 
whether such a measure may be enforced by one Member State against a trader from another 
Member State who is operating within the territory of the first in accordance with the basic 
freedoms provided for by the Treaty. 
The Court has, however, provided much clarification regarding the measures which can be 
considered to be aimed at achieving an imperative objective in the general good. 
Accordingly, it has consistently held that such measures must not have been the subject of 
prior Community harmonization23. 
Through its case-law, the Court has specified the areas which may be considered to be in the 
general good. National rules adopted in one of these areas may still, therefore, under certain 
circumstances outlined below, be enforced against a Community trader. 
The Court has so far recognized the following objectives as being imperative reasons in the 
general good24: 
protection  of the  recipient  of services2 S,  protection  of workers26,  including  social 
protection27,  consumer  protection28,  preservation  of  the  good  reputation  of  the 
22  Joined Cases 110 and 111178  Van  Wesemae/ [1979] ECR 35. 
23  Case  52179  Debauve  [1980]  ECR  833;  Case  205/84;  see  note  7;  Case  353/89  Mediawet  [1991] 
ECR 1-4069. 
24  To this list must be  added a fortiori the provisions of Article 56,  i.e.  public policy, public security and 
public health.  "Mandatory requirements", which are  recognized by the  Court in  its  case-law on the  free 
movement of  goods (protection of  the environment, fairness cf commercial transactions) can probably also 
be invoked in connection with services. 
19 national financial sector29, prevention of fraud3 0, social order3 1,  protection of intellectual 
property32, cultural policy33, preservation of the national historical and artistic heritage34, 
cohesion of the tax system3S, road safety36, protection of creditors37  and protection of the 
proper administration of  justice38. 
The list is open-ended and the Court reserves the right to add to it at any time. 
Most of  these areas can involve banking activity. For example, a national measure aimed at 
protecting recipients of banking services  may,  if it  does  not  come within  the  scope of a 
harmonized area, be relied upon for reasons relating to the general good by a Member State 
vis-a-vis  a  Community  credit  institution  operating  within  its  territory  in  the  context  of 
mutual  recognition.  For  this  rule  to  be  enforceable,  some  additional  conditions  must, 
however, be met. 
2.  General-good "tests " 
In its case-law, the Court has held that: 
"National measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of  fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfil four conditions: they must be applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by  imperative  requirements  in  the 
general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of  the objective which 
they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. 39" 
It  has  consistently  held  that  a  rule  relating  to  the  public  interest  is  enforceable  against 
a person providing services only if "that interest is not protected by the rules to  which the 
person providing the services is subject in the Member State in which he is established"40. 
3.  Procedures for applying the tests 
25  Joined Cases 110/78 and 111/78 Van  Wesemae/; see note 22. 
26  Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305. 
27  Case C-272/94 Guiot [1996] ECR 1-1905. 
28  Case 205/84 Commission v Germany; see note 7. 
29  Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV[1995] ECR 1-1141. 
30  Case C-275/92 Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1039. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Case 62/79 Coditel [1980] ECR 881. 
33  Case C-353/89 Mediawet; see note 23. 
34  Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991] ECR 709. 
35  Case C-204/90, judgment of  28 January 1992, Bachmann [ 1992] ECR 249. 
36  Case 55/93 van Schaik [1994] ECR I-4837. 
37  Judgment  delivered  on  12  December  1996  in  Case  C-3/95  Reisebiiro  Broede  v  Gerd  Sandker 
(not yet reported). 
38  Ibid. 
39  Case C-55/94 Gebhard; see note 6. 
40  Case C-76/90 Sager v.  Dennemeyer; see note 20. 
20 If a host Member State imposes on a credit institution a national measure which does not 
derive  from  Community harmonization  and  which,  in  the  view of the  credit institution, 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services, that institution may question the 
Member State's right  to  do  so  if the  measure  does  not meet the  six  criteria laid down: 
non-discrimination,  absence  of prior  harmonization, . existence  of an  imperative  reason 
relating to the interest of  the general good, non-duplication, nece-ssity and proportionality. 
Such a restriction could relate to the service itself or to the conditions on which it is offered, 
such as relevant advertising4I. 
In  order  to  challenge  a  national  measure  which  constitutes  a  restriction  (e.g.  a  clause 
that must be included in every  contract  and  is  different  from  or unknown  in the normal 
practice of the home Member State) that it considers unjustified,  a credit institution must 
normally have recourse  to  legal  procedures  or inform  the  Commission by,  for  example, 
lodging a complaint. 
In practice, various possibilities are open to it: 
In order to avoid any potential conflict, it may obviously bring all aspects of its services 
into line with the rules of  the host country. 
If, however, it offers banking services which do not correspond exactly to the mandatory 
provisions of the host country, proceedings will probably be brought against it by the 
national authorities or one of its customers. It will then have to  put forward arguments 
based on Community law to a tribunal or national authority in order to establish that the 
rule  which  the  Member State  intends  to  enforce  against  it  does  not comply with  the 
conditions laid down by the Court of Justice. It will be the task of the national courts to 
assess the validity of the parties'  arguments,  possibly after referring  the matter to  the 
Court of  Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 177 of  the Treaty. 
It can at any time inform the Commission, which may, if  it considers the restrictions to be 
unjustified, initiate proceedings against the Member State concerned for failing to meet its 
obligations, in accordance with Article 169. In this case, it will be up to the Commission 
to provide proof of  the alleged failure42. In the final resort, it will be the task of  the Court 
of Justice  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  national  measure  in  question  passes  the 
general-good tests. 
Let us see how these six tests could be applied in practice by the Commission or a judge. 
•  Is the measure discriminatory? 
In its case-law, the Court has consistently defined discrimination as: 
41  Article 21(11) of the Second Banking Directive provides that "Nothing in this Article shall prevent credit 
institutions with head offices in  other Member States from advertising their services through a(l available 
means of  communication in the host Member State, subject to any rules governing the form and the content 
of  such advertising adopted in the interest of  the general good". 
42  Case C-157/91 Commission v Netherlands [1992] ECR 1-5899. 
21 "the application of  different rules to comparable situations or the application of  the same 
rule to different situations "43, 
Consequently, the Commission considers that, if a Member State imposes on a Community 
credit institution measures which it does not impose or imposes more advantageously on its 
own credit institutions, there will be discrimination. 
If  the restriction in question is discriminatory, it can, according to the case-law of the Court, 
be justified only on the grounds set out in Article 56 of the Treaty (public policy, public 
security and public health), subject to compliance with the principle ofproportionality44. 
The concept of  public policy must, according to the Court, be understood in a very restrictive 
sense.  Accordingly,  the  Court  has  consistently  held  that  economic  objectives  cannot 
constitute public-policy grounds within the meaning of  Article 56 of  the Treaty45. 
According to the Court,  "recourse by a national authority to the concept of  public policy 
presupposes, in any event, the existence, in addition to the perturbation to the social order 
which any infringement of  the law involves, of  a genuine and sufficiently serious threat 
affecting one of  the fundamental interests of  society "46• 
It is difficult to see what measures could satisfy this condition of  a serious threat to society in 
the field of banking. It is reasonable to believe, therefore, that discriminatory measures are 
unlikely to be justified in the banking sector. 
•  Does the measure fall within the scope of a harmonized area? 
The Commission considers that the Harmonization Directives define the minimum level of 
the  general  good within the  Community.  In  its  opinion,  this  means  that  a  Member State 
could  not  use  the  general  good  as  justification  for  imposing  on  a  Community  credit 
institution operating in its territory in the context of mutual recognition stricter rules than 
those laid down in the Directives. 
This  is  true  of the  harmonized  rules  concerning  the  taking-up  of the  business  and  the 
conditions for pursuing it (own funds,  minimum capital, deposit guarantee, large exposures, 
cover for lending and market risks, etc.). 
It is also true of  the harmonized rules concerning certain specific banking activities, such as 
those on consumer credit (indication of the  annual percentage rate of charge, right of the 
consumer to discharge his obligations in advance of  the scheduled date, etc.)47. 
43  See most recently Case C-107/94 Asscher [1996] ECR 1-3089. 
44  See most recently Case C-17/92 Federaci6n de Distribuidores Cinematograficos (1993] ECR 1-2239. 
45  Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders (1988] ECR 2085. 
46  Case 30/77 Bouchereau (1977] ECR 1999. 
47  Directives 87/102/EEC and 90/88/EEC; see note 18. 
22 Lastly, it is the case with harmonized rules concerning certain horizontal aspects of  contracts 
(unfair terms48)  and  certain  conditions  relating  to  the  contractual  environment  (contracts 
negotiated away from business premises49, misleading adv_ertising50). 
Where these harmonized rules constitute minimum provisions, however,  a Member State is 
free  to  impose  on  its  own  credit  institutions  stricter  rules  than  those  laid  down  in  the 
Directives. Reverse discrimination is not, in theory, contrary to Community law. The Court 
has in fact  consistently ruled that it  is  not contrary to  the principle of non-discrimination 
enshrined in Community law for  a Member State to treat its own nationals less favourably 
than other Community nationals51. 
Should a Member State impose, for reasons which it deems to be of general good, a level of 
consumer protection  stricter  than  the  one  set  by a  minimal  Community  provision  on  a 
Community credit institution operating on its territory, the proportionality test would, in any 
event, have to be satisfied. 
•  Does the measure have a general-good objective? 
Where  there  is  no  harmonization,  the  Commission  considers  that,  as  the  Court  has 
consistently  ruled,  the  restrictions  imposed  by  a  Member State  are  compatible  with  the 
Treaty  only  "if it  is  established  that  in  the  field  of activity  concerned  there  are 
imperative reasons relating to the public interest (  ...  )"52, 
If the rule does not fall  within the scope of a harmonized area,  it is  necessary to  examine 
whether it comes under one of the areas which the Court has to  date considered as  falling 
within the scope of the interest of the general good (e.g. consumer protection). If this is so, 
the first criterion is met, but the line of  reasoning must be pursued. If this is not so, one can 
merely speculate as  to  whether the  Court would recognize the  area concerned as  coming 
under the interest of  the general good. It must be borne in mind that the Court has an ongoing 
case-law and that it reserves the right to  add new areas to  the existing list on the basis of 
individual cases. 
•  Is  the  interest  of the  general  good  not  already  safeguarded  in  the  country 
of origin? 
48  Directive 93/13/EEC of  5 April1993, OJ No L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29. 
49  Directive 85/577/EEC of20.12.1985, OJ No L 372,31.12.1985, p. 31. 
50  Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984, OJ No L 250, 19.9.1984, p.  17. 
51  Case 332/90 Steen (1992] ECR 1-341; Joined Cases C-29/94 to C-35/94 Aubertin and others [1995] ECR 
1-301.  See  also  the  judgment of 12  December  1996  in  Joined  Cases  C-320/94,  C-328/94,  C-329/94, 
C-337/94,  C-338/94 and C-339/94 making the  use  of minimum provisions conditional upon compliance 
with the Treaty. 
52  Case 205/84 Commission v Germany; see note 7. 
23 It is  necessary to  examine  in this  connection whether the credit institution is  not already 
subject to similar or comparable provisions aimed at safeguarding the same interest under the 
legislation of  its Member State of  origin. 
Under the Second Banking Directive, this criterion could be important, particularly for the 
purpose  of assessing  the  compatibility  of the  measures  imposed  by  the  host  State  in 
exercising its residual powers. 
For example,  it is  necessary to  examine in the  context of this  "test",  the  extent to  which 
certain controls required by the host State might already be  carried out in  the  country of 
origin, the extent to which accounting, supervisory, statistical or financial information might 
already be communicated to the competent authority of  the country of  origin, etc. 
•  Is the measure capable of guaranteeing that the objective will be met? 
Even if a measure is presented by a host State as  defending an  objective conducive to  the 
general good, one may ask whether it is really necessary in order to protect that interest. 
There may be instances where  a measure is  not objectively necessary or is  not suited to 
protecting the interest. 
The Court of Justice assesses such circumstances and has held in certain judgments that a 
given rule that was justified by the host country on grounds of consumer protection was not 
in the end likely to provide such protection. 
For example, the Court has held that, since information is one of the principal requirements 
of consumer  protection,  a  Member State  which  imposes  rules  which  ultimately  restrict 
consumers' access to  certain kinds of information cannot justify those rules on grounds of 
consumer protection  53. 
The Court, therefore,  carefully examines the  measure presented to  it in order to  ascertain 
whether it actually benefits the consumer54 and whether the Member State imposing it is not 
underestimating the consumer's ability to judge for himself55.  In this way, it checks whether 
certain measures, under cover of consumer protection, are not actually aimed at achieving 
less worthy objectives connected with the protection of  the national market. 
•  Does  the  measure  not  go  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  achieve  the 
objective pursued? 
Finally, it is necessary to  ask whether there are not less restrictive means of achieving the 
general-good objective pursued.  This involves the application of the legal principle of the 
appropriateness of  the response in relation to the risk. 
53  Case C-362/88 GB-INNO-BM [1990] ECR I-667. 
54  See also judgment in Case C-240/95 Schmit [1996] ECR I-3179. 
55  See in particular Case C-470/93 Mars [1995] ECR I-1923. Ir, this judgment, the Court had recourse to the 
concept of  "circumspect consumers". 
24 The Court systematically examines whether the Member State did not have at its disposal 
measures with a less restrictive effect on trade56. In the context of such an examination, the 
Court may deduce from a comparative analysis of  the legislation of  the other Member States 
that less restrictive consumer protection measures exist  5 7• However, the Court has also ruled 
that "the fact that one Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member State 
does not mean that the latter's rules are disproportionate and hence incompatible with 
Community law "58. 
Where a national measure constituting a restriction on a credit institution benefiting from 
mutual recognition is justified by the host State on the ground that it protects the recipient of 
the  service,  it  is  essential,  in  checking  whether  the  proportionality  test  is  satisfied,  to 
question the actual need to protect the recipient. 
The Court held, in its judgment of 4 December 1986,  Commission  v Germany,  that "there 
may be cases where,  because of  the nature of  the risk insured and of  the party seeking 
insurance, there is no need to protect the latter by the application of  the mandatory rules 
of  his nationallaw"59. The scope ofthis ruling naturally goes beyond the field of  insurance. 
It is  necessary,  therefore,  to  give  consideration,  in  each  individual  case,  to  the  need 
for protection  of  the  recipient  of  the  banking  service  offered  in  the  context  of 
mutual recognition by examining the nature of the service and the level of sophistication of 
the recipient. 
The Commission considers that Member States should, in imposing their general-good rules, 
make  a  distinction  according  to  whether  or  not  services  are  supplied  to  circumspect 
recipients.  In other words, in order to respect the principle of proportionality, they should 
take account of  the degree of  vulnerability of  the persons they are setting out to protect. 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  94/19/EC  on  deposit  guarantees  and,  in 
particular,  the  possible  exclusions  for  which  it  provides,  may  be  taken  as  a  basis  for 
determining  whether  a  recipient  is  circumspect6o.  The  logic  underlying  these  possible 
exclusions is in fact  the same as  that being defended in the present communication. As  a 
guide,  it  may  be  considered  that  credit  institutions,  financial  institutions,  insurance 
undertakings, central and other government authorities, Ucits, pension funds and companies 
within the meaning of  point 14 of Annex I to Directive 94/19/EC61 are customers of a nature 
56  See most recently Case C-101/94 Commission v Italy  ("SIM'~ (1996] ECR 2691. See also Case C-384/93 
Alpine Investments; see note 29. 
57  Case C-129/91 Yves Rocher (1993] ECR 1-2361. 
58  Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments; see note 29. 
59  Case 205/84 Commission v Germany; see note 7. 
60  Directiveof30May 1994,0JNoL 135,31.5.1994,p. 5. 
61  Companies comprising more than 50 people with a balance-sheet total of  at least ECU 2 500 000 and a net 
turnover of  at least ECU 5 000 000. Council Directive 94/8/EC of  21  March 1994, OJ No L 82, 25.3 .1994, 
p. 33. 
25 or size such that they are in a position to recognize the risks they are incurring and to commit 
themselves in full knowledge ofthe facts. 
For example, business transactions of  the type listed in the Annex, when carried out between 
professionals in the  financial  sector,  should not be the  subject of particular general-good 
rules  imposed  by  the  host  Member State.  The  proportionality  test  would  be  especially 
difficult to satisfy in such cases. 
Finally, it is necessary in certain cases to determine whether the service is supplied under the 
freedom to provide services or by a branch. 
An assessment of the proportionality of a restriction may in  fact  differ depending on  the 
mode of  operation. 
Accordingly, a restriction could more readily be considered to be proportionate in the case of 
an  operator working permanently within a territory than  in the  case of the  same operator 
working only temporarily. 
The  Court  has  recognized  this  difference  by  imposing  a  less  restnctlve  and  more 
"lightweight" legal  framework  for  suppliers of services operating in  a temporary capacity 
than for established suppliers. 
It has consistently held that a Member State: 
"may not make the provision of  services in its territory subject to compliance with all the 
conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of  all practical effectiveness the 
provisions of  the Treaty whose object is,  precisely,  to  guarantee the freedom  to provide 
services "62, 
The Court has  also held that restrictions on the  freedom  to  provide services are even less 
acceptable in cases where the service is supplied "without its being necessary for the person 
providing  it  to  visit  the  territory  of the  Member State  where  it  is  provided"63,  This 
clarification  is  particularly relevant  to  banking  services,  which  are  increasingly  supplied 
without physical movement on the part of  the supplier. 
The Court has likewise consistently held that it does not follow from the third paragraph of 
Article 60 of  the Treaty that: 
"all national legislation  applicable to  nationals of  that State and usually applied to the 
permanent activities of undertakings established therein  may be similarly applied in  its 
entirety  to  the  temporary  activities  of undertakings  which  are  established  in  other 
Member States. 64" 
62  Case C-76/90 Sager; see note 20.  See also Case C-198/89 Commission v Greece [1991] ECR 1-727. 
63  Case C-76/90 Sager; see note 20. 
64  Case  205/84  Commission  v  Germany;  see  note  7.  See  also  the  judgment  of  17  December  1981, 
Case 279/80 Webb; see note 26. 
26 Thus,  depending  on  the  circumstances,  the  same  restriction  applied  in  the  interest  of 
the general good could be adjudged proportionate in respect of  a branch but disproportionate 
in respect of a temporary provider of  services. The Commission considers, for example, that 
a  Member State  which  imposes  certain  · formalities  on  credit  institutions 
(controls, registration, costs, communication of  information, etc.) for reasons that purport to 
be i!1 the general good should take account of the mode of operation chosen by the credit 
institution carrying on activities within its territory under mutual-recognition arrangements. 
However,  this  distinction  cannot  be  applied  to  consumer-protection  rules  (provided,  of 
course, that they have satisfied the other tests). The level of consumer protection required 
must be identical, whether the service is supplied under the freedom to provide services or by 
way of establishment. It would be unacceptable for  a consumer to  be less well protected 
according  to  whether  he  received  a  service  from  a  non-established  undertaking  or  an 
established undertaking. 
It may be necessary, however, to take account of  the circumstances in which the service was 
requested.  There may be  situations  in  which  the  consumer has  deliberately  avoided  the 
protection afforded him by his national law, particularly where he requests a service from a 
non-established bank without having first been canvassed in any way by that bank. 
C.  INTEREST OF THE GENERAL GOOD AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
1.  Principles 
An examination of the compatibility with Community law of a national rule justified on 
general-good grounds may be carried out where a legal discrepancy caused by an absence of 
harmonization creates an obstacle to the movement ofbanking services. 
Any national rule must be compatible with Community law irrespective of  the area in which 
it falls. In a judgment delivered on 21  March 1972, the Court ruled that: 
''The effectiveness of Community law cannot vary according to the various branches of 
national law which it may affect.65" 
Where  necessary,  Community  law  takes  precedence,  therefore,  over  national  private 
law provisions. 
The Court has accordingly had to check the compatibility with Community law of national 
provisions of  civillaw66 and civil procedure67. 
65  Case 82/71 SAIL [1972] ECR 119. See also Case 20/92 Hubbard [1993] ECR 1-3777. 
66  Case C-168/91 Konstantinidis [1993] ECR 1-1191; Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique [1991] ECR 1-107; 
judgment of 13 October 1993,Case C-93/92 Motorradcenter [1993) ECR 1-5009. 
67  See  in this connection Case C-398/92 Mund &  Fester [1994)  ECR 1-467;  Case C-43/95  Data  Delecta 
Aktiebolag [1996] ECR 1-4661; Case C-177/94 Perfili [1996]  ECR 1-161; see also Case 20/92 Hubbard; 
see note 65. 
27 It may be stated that most contractual rules falling within the scope of civil law or procedural 
law  (means  of extinguishing  obligations,  limitation  periods,  expiry,  invalidity,  etc.)  are 
unlikely to constitute barriers to the trade in banking services. 
However,  banking contracts do  contain provisions,  usually of a mandatory nature,  which 
may well constitute rules on contractual obligations, but actually affect trade. Let us take, for 
example,  a clause preventing  any  variation  in  a rate  or  relating  to  early repayment.  The 
effects of such provisions may constitute a restriction if they oblige a bank to alter a service 
to bring it into line with the legislation of  the country in which it is marketed. 
The Commission considers that  such provisions cannot escape the  controls laid down by 
Community  law  simply  on  the  ground  that  they  fall  within  the  scope  of the  law  on 
contractual obligations. 
In this context, a judge may be required to examine the compatibility with Community law 
of  the  results  achieved  by  applying  the  rules  on  the  choice  of  law  governing 
contractual obligations contained in private international legal instruments, particularly the 
Rome Convention6s. 
Such choice-of-law rules do  not, however, constitute restrictions in themselves. It is not, in 
principle, the mechanism for designating the law applicable which constitutes a barrier but 
the result to which it leads under substantive law69. 
2.  Link with the Rome Convention 
This Convention establishes the principle of contractual freedom,  which is  common to all 
Member States. 
The parties to a banking contract may, therefore, freely choose the law which is to govern the 
contract and the obligations which they mutually undertake to fulfil. This may be the law of 
the home country, the host country or even a third country, whether or not a Member of the 
European Union. 
The  Convention  lays  down  that,  where  no  choice  is  expressed  by  the  parties,  the  law 
applicable is that of  the country with which the contract is most closely connected. Under the 
Convention,  this  is  presumed  to  be  the  country  where  the  party  who  is  to  effect  the 
performance  has  his  habitual  residence  or  principal  or  secondary  place  of business, 
depending on whether the performance is to be effected by the parent company or a branch. 
In the case of  a contract concluded with a consumer70, the Convention lays down that, where 
the parties do not express a choice, the law applicable is that of the country of the consumer 
if  the contract is entered into in one of  the following sets of  circumstances (Article 5): 
68  See note 4. 
69  See, however, Case C-214/94 Boukhalfa [1996] ECR I-2253. 
70  Contract carried out for a purpose outside his trade or profession. 
28 the contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer in his 
.  country and he had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the 
conclusion of  the contract; 
the other party or his agent received the consumer's order in that country. 
Where, however, the parties have chosen the law governing the contract, this choice must not 
deprive the consumer of the protection afforded him by the mandatory rules71  of  the law of 
the  country in which he  has  his  habitual  residence  if one of the  sets  of circumstances 
described above is found to prevail. 
In addition,  under the  Convention,  the  "mandatory rules" (Article 7)  and  ''public policy" 
(Article 16)72 of  Member States may be applied at the choice of  the parties or, in the absence 
of  an express choice, according to the relevant rules contained in the Convention. 
On the basis of  the Rome Convention, a banking contract concluded with a consumer must, 
therefore, observe at least the mandatory rules of the law of the consumer's country if the 
consumer was first canvassed in the consumer's country or if the order for the service was 
received there. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  banking  contract  is  concluded  not  with  a  consumer 
(contract concluded between a bank and a customer acting in the course of  his business), the 
contract will be governed by the law chosen by the parties and, in the absence of  an express 
choice, by the law of the country where the bank has its  principal or secondary place of 
business. 
3.  Precedence of  Community law 
The Commission considers that a further level of reasoning must be added to that deriving 
from the application of  the Rome Convention. 
Thus, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of Community law, the provisions 
of substantive law applicable to a banking service pursuant to the choice-of-law rules laid 
down in the Rome Convention (it being possible for freedom of choice to be overridden by 
mandatory  rules,  mandatory  requirements  and  public  policy)  may,  if they  constitute  a 
restriction, be examined in the light ofthe general good. 
Two possible situations may be envisaged73: 
71  Provisions which cannot be derogated from by contract. 
72  This concept must be understood here within its meaning under national law and private international law, 
which is  not necessarily the  meaning  conferred upon  it by  the  Court of Justice;  for  the  latter,  it  is  a 
non-economic concept, implying a serious threat to society. 
73  The Court of Justice will be responsible for interpreting the Rome Con:vention, particularly with a view to 
guaranteeing an interpretation that is compatible with Community law. However, it is not yet empowered 
to do so since the two protocols vesting such powers in the Court (89/128/EEC and 89/129/EEC) have not 
29 (a)  Banking services supplied by a branch 
Article 4 of the Rome  Convention lays  down that the  law applicable in  the  absence  of a 
choice by the parties is that of  the country in which the principal place of  business is situated 
or, if the performance is to be effected through a place of business other than the principal 
place  of business,  the  country  in  which  that  other  place  of business  is  situated.  The 
Convention therefore implies that, where a service is supplied by a bank branch, the law of 
the country where the branch is situated is presumed to prevail in the absence of  a choice by 
the parties concerned74. 
In accordance  with the  principle  of the  precedence  of Community  law,  the  Commission 
considers that, where the legal provisions of  the country of  the branch constitute a restriction, 
they may be put to the general-good test and, if  necessary, overruled. 
(b)  Banking services supplied to consumers under the freedom to provide services 
According  to  the  principle  of the  precedence  of Community  law,  the  application  by  a 
consumer's country of residence of its  "mandatory rules",  "mandatory requirements" and 
''public policy" provisions to contracts entered into by the consumer may also be put to the 
general-good test if  a restriction results. 
It is necessary, therefore, to extend the line of  reasoning developed on the basis of the Rome 
Convention  and  to  question  whether,  for  example,  the  "mandatory  rules"  which  the 
consumer's country intends to enforce satisfy the general-good tests. Since they are adopted 
with a view to  protecting the consumer, there is  a strong chance  that  these provisions of 
substantive  law  will  pass  the  general-good  test.  The  Court  has  in  fact  recognized  that 
consumer protection is a general-good objective which justifies restrictions on fundamental 
freedoms. It cannot be assumed, however, that they will pass the general-good test in every 
case.  It has  been seen  above  that  national  rules  which purport to  have  been adopted  for 
reasons  of consumer protection  may  be  subjected  to  review  by  the  Court  and  possibly 
"disqualified" if  they are, for example, unnecessary or disproportionate. 
In the context of  the single market, therefore, this additional level of  reasoning is essential in 
order to ascertain whether, in the absence of harmonization, national measures are not being 
maintained, in the guise of consumer-protection measures, merely in order to  restrict or to 
prevent banking services which are  different or unfamiliar from  gaining entry to  national 
territory. 
yet entered into force  since not all the Member States which ratified the Rome Convention have ratified 
protocol 89/129/EEC. 
74  Under normal circumstances, however, the parties to a banking contract would choose which law to apply. 
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